From a verified kernel towards verified systems
Authors
School of Computer Science and Engineering
University of New South Wales
Sydney 2052 Australia
NICTA, Sydney,
Australia
Abstract
The L4.verified project has produced a formal, machine-checked Isabelle/HOL proof that the C code of the seL4 OS microkernel correctly implements its abstract implementation. This paper briefly summarises the proof, its main implications and assumptions, reports on the experience in conducting such a large-scale verification, and finally lays out a vision how this formally verified kernel may be used for gaining formal, code-level assurance about safety and security properties of systems on the order of a million lines of code.
This paper is an extended abstract for an invited talk at APLAS 2010.
BibTeX Entry
@inproceedings{Klein_10,
publisher = {Springer-Verlag},
author = {Gerwin Klein},
title = {From a Verified Kernel towards Verified Systems},
series = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the 8th Asian Symposium on Programming Languages and Systems},
address = {Shanghai, China},
year = {2010},
month = {Nov},
volume = {6461},
editor = {Kazunori Ueda},
pages = {21--33}
}