A formally verified OS kernel. Now what?
Authors
School of Computer Science and Engineering
University of New South Wales
Sydney 2052 Australia
NICTA, Sydney,
Australia
Abstract
Last year, the L4.verified project produced a formal, machine-checked Isabelle/HOL proof that the C code of the seL4 OS microkernel correctly implements its abstract implementation. In my presentation I will summarise the proof together with its main implications and assumptions, I will describe in which kinds of systems this formally verified kernel can be used for gaining assurance on overall system security, and I will explore further future research directions that open up with a formally verified OS kernel.
This paper is an extended abstract for an invited talk at ITP 2010.
BibTeX Entry
@inproceedings{Klein_10a,
publisher = {Springer-Verlag},
author = {Gerwin Klein},
title = {A Formally Verified {OS} Kernel. {Now} What?},
series = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science},
booktitle = {1st International Conference on Interactive Theorem Proving},
address = {Edinburgh, UK},
year = {2010},
month = {Jul},
volume = {6172},
editor = {Matt Kaufmann and Lawrence C Paulson},
pages = {1--7}
}