Provable security: How feasible is it?
Authors
Gerwin Klein, Toby Murray, Peter Gammie, Thomas Sewell and Simon Winwood
School of Computer Science and Engineering
University of New South Wales
Sydney 2052 Australia
NICTA, Sydney,
Australia
Abstract
Strong, machine-checked security proofs of operating systems have been in the too hard basket long enough.
They will still be too hard for large mainstream operating systems, but even for systems designed from the ground up for security they have been counted as infeasible. There are high-level formal models, nice security properties, ways of architecting and engineering secure systems, but no implementation level proofs yet, not even with the recent verification of the seL4 microkernel.
This needs to change.
BibTeX Entry
@inproceedings{Klein_MGSW_11,
publisher = {USENIX},
title = {Provable Security: How feasible is it?},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Hot Topics in Operating Systems},
author = {Gerwin Klein and Toby Murray and Peter Gammie and Thomas Sewell and Simon Winwood},
year = {2011},
month = {May},
address = {Napa, CA, USA},
pages = {5}
}